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Abstract 
The Simplified Acquisition of Base Engineering Requirements (SABER) 
contract's main purpose is to expedite contract award of civil engineer requirements 
through the issuance of individual delivery orders. The contract contains a collection of 
detailed task specifications that include most types of real property maintenance, repair, 
and construction work. 
The Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Acquisition's Operational 
Contracting Division (SAF/AQCO) identified a number of failed SABER contracts. The 
problem statement designed for this research effort was: 
There are a large number of SABER contractors that are failing during the 
performance period on their SABER contracts. SAF/AQCO is trying to 
identify whether any Government actions or procedures are negatively 
impacting the contractor's ability to perform satisfactorily on the SABER 
contract. 
This research effort focused on five areas within the SABER process that is 
controlled by the Government. A qualitative approach using case study analysis was 
used. Seven SABER contracts were selected as case studies. 
The research did not identify any Air Force-wide procedures in the five areas that 
negatively impacted the contractor's ability to perform satisfactorily on the contract. 
The research identified two areas of potential follow-on research. 
AN ANALYSIS OF THE ACQUISITION PROCESS FOR SIMPLIFIED 
ACQUISITION OF BASE ENGINEERING REQUIREMENTS (SABER) 
CONTRACTS AND ITS 
POTENTIAL IMPACT ON CONTRACTOR PERFORMANCE 
/. Introduction 
The Air Force Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement (AFFARS) Appendix 
DD defines a Simplified Acquisition of Base Engineering Requirements (SABER) 
contract as a fixed-price, indefinite-delivery, indefinite-quantity (IDIQ) contract that 
contains provisions for economic price adjustments. Containing a collection of detailed 
task specifications, a SABER contract includes most types of real property maintenance, 
repair, and construction work (AFFARS DD, 2000:DD-102). 
A SABER contract's main purpose is to expedite contract award of civil engineer 
requirements through the issuance of individual delivery orders (DO). A SABER 
program achieves this purpose through a reduction in the acquisition lead time and civil 
engineering design work (AFFARS DD, 2000:DD-103(a)). 
There are six benefits of a successfully run SABER program. Two primary 
benefits are identified in AFFARS Appendix DD. The first benefit is that the 
Government obtains improved customer service and responsiveness. The acquisition 
lead-time for issuance of a DO is approximately three to four weeks (AFFARS DD, 
2000:DD-103(b)(l)). This is compared to traditional construction acquisition methods 
that have a normal acquisition lead time of at least 60 days. 
The second benefit is that the Government motivates the contractor to produce 
high quality work in a timely manner (AFFARS DD, 2000:DD- 103(b)(2)). 
As an IDIQ contract, a SABER contract provides the Government with the 
majority of control as to the amount of work the contractor will be awarded. SABER 
contracts include a stated minimum and maximum dollar amount that the Government 
can award to the contractor. The Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) Part 16.504(a)(2) 
identifies that the minimum amount awarded must be greater than a nominal amount, but 
should not exceed the amount that the Government is fairly certain to award. When 
determining the stated maximum amount, FAR 16.504(a)(1) provides that the 
Government's contracting officer should establish a reasonable maximum amount based 
on a number of factors. These factors include market research, trends for similar work, 
and a survey of potential demand within the using community (FAR, 2000:16.504). 
Often, the difference between the minimum and maximum dollar amount is large. For 
example, a number of the SABER contracts studied contained a stated minimum amount 
of $200,000 with a stated maximum amount of $5,000,000 over the 5-year contract 
period. 
One way that the Government motivates the SABER contractor is through the 
Government's authority to award DOs above the stated minimum dollar amount. If the 
contractor is producing high quality work in a timely manner, the Government will 
continue awarding work until the contract performance period ends or the contract 
maximum dollar amount is reached. If the contractor is not performing satisfactorily, the 
Government is under no obligation to award work above the stated minimum dollar 
amount. At that point, the Government has the ability to use traditional construction 
contracting methods to satisfy future requirements until the existing SABER contract's 
period of performance ends. The Government then reserves the right not to exercise any 
available option to the current SABER contract and is free to reprocure the requirement 
through a new source selection process. Theoretically, the second benefit of a successful 
SABER program results from the potential for the contractor to lose work above the 
stated minimum dollar amount, which acts as a motivator for the contractor to provide 
top quality work in a timely manner (AFFARS DD, 2000:DD-103). 
Recently, the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Acquisition's Operational 
Contracting Division (SAF/AQCO) identified a number of installations that are having 
problems with its SABER contractors. Some contractors have gone out of business and 
defaulted on their contracts. Other contractors have not lived up to the performance 
standards identified in the SABER contract. In these situations, the Government decided 
not to exercise the next option on the existing SABER contract. 
As in the commercial world, a failed contract with the Government negatively 
impacts both the buyer-the Government does not get what it needs-and the seller—the 
contractor loses revenue and risks financial instability. Since it is not the intent of the 
Government to place a contractor in financial distress, the aforementioned problems 
relating to SABER contracts have led to concern within SAF/AQCO on whether the Air 
Force's acquisition strategy is creating an environment that leads these contractors to 
failure. This concern led to the following problem statement. 
Problem Statement 
There are a large number of SABER contractors that are failing during the 
performance period on their SABER contracts. SAF/AQCO is trying to identify 
whether any Government actions or procedures are negatively impacting the 
contractor's ability to perform satisfactorily on the SABER contract. 
For the purpose of this research, contractor failure is defined by two outcomes. 
First, a SABER contractor defaults on its contract during the period of performance. 
Typically, the contractor either goes out of business or decides to no longer perform work 
on the existing contract. This results in the Government exercising its right to terminate 
the contractor for default. 
The second failure outcome results from poor performance by the contractor 
during the period of performance. The poor performance leads to a Government decision 
to not exercise an existing option on the SABER contract. 
Research Question and Subsidiary Research Questions 
The main research question developed for this thesis is: 
Are there any Government-controlled factors of the SABER acquisition process 
that is leading to contractor failure during the contract's period of performance? 
In addition to the main research question, a number of subsidiary research 
questions were developed that were potential factors in contributing to contractor failure. 
These areas were specifically identified for research analysis from the case studies to 
determine whether they were contributory factors in contract failure, where applicable. 
These subsidiary questions are: 
(1) What was the Government's method of pricing the SABER contract? Did 
this pricing method negatively impact the contractor's ability to satisfactorily 
perform? 
(2) What role, if applicable, did liquidated damages have during the performance 
of the SABER contract? Did the assessment of liquidated damages, when 
applied, negatively impact the contractor's ability to satisfactorily perform on 
existing and future SABER DOs? 
(3) Does the Government reimburse the contractor for the cost of preparing a 
proposal for a project that is eventually not executed? If not, did this practice 
negatively impact the contractor's ability to satisfactorily perform on the contract? 
(4) How does the Government balance the issuance of SABER delivery orders 
over the course of the contract period? Were there any surges, particularly in the 
fiscal year 4th quarter, which negatively impacted the SABER contractor's ability 
to satisfactorily perform? 
(5) Was there any inappropriate use of the SABER contract? If so, did this 
negatively impact the SABER contractor's ability to satisfactorily perform? 
Research Objective 
The objective of this research effort was to identify and analyze any conditions 
that may have been created by the current acquisition strategy and lead to SABER 
contractor failures. 
Prior to conducting the research, there were no specific anticipated results. 
Preliminary inquiries determined that there were a number of failed SABER contracts 
throughout the Air Force. Each SABER contract failure represented that installation's 
unique situation. There was limited information to specifically identify whether any 
aspect of the Government's acquisition process, as a whole, was responsible for the failed 
contracts. Therefore, this research was geared to determine whether there is an overall 
problem with the current process. 
Research Methodology 
A qualitative approach was used for conducting the research. Case study analysis 
was determined as an effective method of research. Interviews and the compilation of 
case study documents were used for research data collection. A number of Air Force 
bases were identified where a SABER contractor has either defaulted or will not be 
renewed for the next option period. Interview subjects included base contracting and 
civil engineering personnel. Primarily for legal reasons, SABER contractors were not 
interviewed during this research effort. Chapter III, Limitations of the Research, fully 
addresses the rationale behind this decision. 
The purpose of collecting this data was to identify similarities or trends in the 
numerous contractor failures and to determine if they are related to conditions resulting 
from Government actions in the acquisition process. 
Information was gathered to identify the processes and procedures used during the 
source selection process, the contract award process, and the contract performance. The 
specific area of focus was on any circumstances that led to contractor failure on the 
contract. The details and specifics of the data collection process is presented in 
Chapter III, Methodology. 
Scope of Research 
The main research question encompasses all of the aspects of the SABER 
acquisition process. The subsidiary questions included specific areas that were identified 
as potential problematic areas to analyze. These questions were developed prior to the 
collection of the data for this research. 
The Research Objective section identified that there were no specific anticipated 
results. Therefore, the scope of the research encompassed the entire SABER acquisition 
process while it focused on five specific areas of interest. 
Relevance of the Research 
This research provided empirical data that directly impacts two communities 
within the Air Force. These two areas are SAF/AQCO and the Air Force Institute of 
Technology's Civil Engineering and Services School's Department of Engineering 
Management (AFIT/CEM). 
The research will be used by SAF/AQCO in two ways. The research will aid 
SAF/AQCO in the rewrite of AFFARS Appendix DD. This rewrite will directly impact 
the procedures and processes used by each Air Force operational contracting squadron 
that utilizes the SABER contract. 
Furthermore, the research will also be used by SAF/AQCO for the rewrite of the 
SABER Guide, which was last published in 1992. The new SABER guide will be written 
in conjunction with the Air Force Logistics Management Agency, who co-authored the 
SABER Guide written in 1992. 
AFIT/CEM will also use this research in two ways. Primarily, the research will 
help validate the program's course material for its SABER course offered to all 
organizations that utilize or intend on utilizing a SABER contract. Participants in past 
courses included government contracting and civil engineer personnel, as well as SABER 
contractors. In addition, the empirical data will provide field feedback on the SABER 
program, to include the successes and opportunities for improvement within the SABER 
community. This information can be used to survey the using community to identify best 
practices and lessons learned in the SABER program. 
Summary 
Chapter I provided an introduction to the research topic related to this thesis 
effort. The chapter provided a definition of a SABER contract followed by the purpose 
and the benefits of a SABER contract. In addition, this chapter introduced the problem 
statement and the research questions on which the research focused. The objective of the 
research was also covered. Chapter I also provided a brief introduction to the 
methodology used for the research effort. Chapter I concluded with the scope and the 
relevance of the research. 
Chapter II, Literature Review, will provide the specifics of the SABER contract 
and the SABER acquisition process that is presented in the current literature. Chapter III, 
Methodology, will break down the methods and applicable tools that were used in 
collecting the necessary data to meet the research objective. Chapter IV, Analysis, will 
provide the data and information gathered during the interviews and installation visits. 
Finally, Chapter V, Results and Conclusions, will provide the results from the research as 
well as any conclusions that can be made from the research data collected. 
II. Literature Review 
Chapter II synopsizes recent literature available on the Air Force's SABER 
program. The first part of this chapter focuses on the indefinite-delivery, indefinite- 
quantity (IDIQ) contracts. The second part covers acquisition planning involved with 
Government acquisitions, specifically SABER acquisitions. The third and final part of 
the chapter provides the specifics of the SABER program. 
There is a limited amount of literature available specific to the Air Force's 
SABER program. Literature regarding Government acquisitions in general was found in 
the Federal Acquisition Regulation. The primary literature on SABER includes the Air 
Force Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement (AFFARS) Appendix DD and the 
SABER Guide, published in 1992 by the Air Force Logistics Management Agency and 
the Air Force Civil Engineering Support Agency. 
Indefinite-Delivery, Indefinite Quantity (IDIQ) Contracts 
As stated in Chapter I, the contract instrument used by the SABER contract is a 
fixed-price indefinite-delivery, indefinite-quantity (IDIQ) contract. Federal Acquisition 
Regulation (FAR) Subpart 16.5, Indefinite-Delivery Contracts, provides the guidance for 
making awards of indefinite-delivery contracts. 
The use of IDIQ contracts is appropriate when the Government cannot 
predetermine the quantities or delivery times of recurring requirements for services or 
supplies during the contract period (FAR, 2000:16.504(b)). 
The Government is required to provide a stated minimum and maximum quantity, 
in dollar values or number of units, in each IDIQ contract. SABER contracts state dollar 
values since each requirement is unique under the contract (FAR, 2000:16.504(a)). 
The contracting officer must ensure the stated minimum quantity is "more than a 
nominal quantity, but it should not exceed the amount that the Government is fairly 
certain to order" (FAR, 2000:16.504(a)(2)). 
Acquisition Planning 
FAR Subpart 7.1, Acquisition Plans, defines acquisition planning as "the process 
by which the efforts of all personnel responsible for an acquisition are coordinated and 
integrated through a comprehensive plan for fulfilling the agency need in a timely 
manner and at a reasonable cost. It includes developing the overall strategy for managing 
the acquisition" (FAR, 2000:7.101). 
Like the head coach of a National Football League team going to the Super Bowl, 
the Government wants to enter into its acquisition procurements with a strong game plan. 
The acquisition plan is just the vehicle the Government team needs for this purpose. 
FAR 7.102(a) requires each agency to perform acquisition planning for all acquisitions. 
FAR Subpart 7 prescribes the policies and procedures for acquisition planning for 
all Government procurements. In addition to this guidance, AFFARS DD-203, SABER 
Acquisition Strategy, identifies specific efforts the Government should make in SABER 
procurements. 
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SABER Acquisition Strategy and Plan Development 
AFFARS Appendix DD Part 2 covers the SABER acquisition planning and 
source selection process. 
Establishment of a SABER Working Group 
The initial step in the SABER acquisition process is to establish a SABER 
working group. The working group should consist of the SABER personnel from the 
contracting and civil engineering squadrons. The group should be led by the CE SABER 
Chief or the base civil engineer (BCE) and the contracting officer should be an assistant 
on the group. Initial tasks should involve estimating the expected scope of the SABER 
program for the base, attempting to obtain up-front funding and projected budget 
requirements from associate organizations, and deciding on the best organizational 
structure for the SABER unit, to include the number of personnel assigned to the team 
(AFFARS DD, 2000:DD-201). The working group's efforts lead to the SABER 
Acquisition Strategy Panel (ASP). 
SABER Acquisition Strategy Panel and Acquisition Plan 
AFFARS Appendix DD-203 requires the contracting officer to convene an ASP at 
the earliest practical point in the SABER acquisition process. The primary objective of 
the ASP is to ensure the government establishes an effective approach to the SABER 
acquisition process (AFFARS DD, 2000:DD-203(a)). 
Big picture considerations in preparing for the ASP include the acquisition 
background and program objectives for the base's SABER program, the anticipated 
SABER requirements and program value, applicable contractual specifications, and 
pricing methodology (AFFARS DD, 2000:DD-203(c)). 
In addition, AFFARS DD-203(d) prescribes 10 specific areas to include: 
- The anticipated sources for the SABER requirement, 
- Competition issues such as the need to enhance competition as well as the use 
of streamline source selection procedures identified in acquisition reform 
initiatives, 
- Unique contracting considerations regarding the requirement, 
- Funding and budgeting issues, 
- Management information considerations, 
- The use of Government-furnished property on the contract, 
- Environmental issues, 
-Security issues, 
- Milestones for the SABER acquisition cycle, and 
- Identification of personnel for the SABER acquisition process. 
A product from the ASP process is the Acquisition Plan. The Acquisition Plan is 
the roadmap for the SABER source selection process. Elements of the Acquisition Plan 
include the SABER acquisition's background, the acquisition objectives, a plan of action 
or game plan for the source selection process, and a list of milestones for the source 
selection (FAR, 2000:7.105). 
Following these activities, the BCE is responsible for preparing the SABER 
program specifications. AFFARS Appendix DD-202 provides the specifics that should 
be included in this part of the process. 
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In addition to this process, the BCE prepares the unit price book (UPB), which is 
described below. The UPB must be localized to reflect the costs of various task 
specifications within the base's region. The accomplishment of the UPB is vital in the 
acquisition process since the UPB is included in the SABER Request for Proposal and 
will be the basis for the offerer's proposed coefficients and eventual contract pricing 
(AFFARS DD, 2000:DD-202(b)). 
SABER Request for Proposal 
The SABER Request for Proposal is the official document sent out by the SABER 
contracting officer to potential bidders interested in submitting proposals for award of the 
SABER contract. 
AFFARS Appendix DD-205 lists the specific information that should be included 
in the SABER Request for Proposal. 
SABER Source Selection Procedures 
Air Force Acquisition Circular 96-2 eliminated AFFARS Appendix BB, Source 
Selection Procedures For Other Than Major Acquisitions, which was the guidance for 
source selection procedures for SABER acquisitions. 
In lieu of this change, FAR 36.103, Methods of Contracting, establish the criteria 
that should be used in conducting SABER source selections. In referencing FAR 
6.401(a), FAR 36.103 sets the use of sealed bidding as the preferred method of 
contracting. However, FAR 6.401(b) establishes the exceptions that allow the 
contracting officer to use the competitive proposal process, which allow negotiations. 
The procedures for sealed bid procurements are covered in FAR Part 14. The 
competitive proposal procedures are covered in FAR Part 15. 
SABER Contracts 
The SABER contact is a fixed-price indefinite-delivery, indefinite-quantity 
(IDIQ) contract that may contain provisions for economic price adjustments during the 
term of the contract. Each SABER contract contains a set of detailed task specifications 
that cover most types of real property maintenance, repair, and construction work. 
SABER contracts are normally awarded for one year and can contain a maximum of four 
option years that may be subsequently awarded (AFFARS, 2000: DD-102). The 
following sections will review the history of the SABER contract, as well as describe the 
purpose and benefits of the SABER contract. This section will conclude with an 
overview of the SABER delivery order process. 
SABER History 
The SABER contract was first used in January 1987 at McClellan Air Force Base, 
California. The SABER program was modeled after the Army and Navy's Job Order 
Contracting (JOC) program. JOC was developed and implemented in an effort to 
overcome a number of problems including the performance quality and responsiveness of 
the contractor. Following a brief test period at McClellan, SABER contracts were 
authorized for use Air Force-wide (SABER Guide, 1992:1). 
The SABER program was developed to complement traditional construction 
contracting methods. A SABER contract is designed to expedite contract award of Civil 
Engineer (CE) requirements relating to the procurement of most types of real property 
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maintenance, repair, and construction work (SABER Guide, 1992:4). Under traditional 
construction contracting methods, individual requirements identified would be procured 
through a competitive source selection process that required a minimum of 60 days. 
Since its inception, the SABER contract has grown to be an effective contract 
tool. In data collected by the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Acquisition's 
Operational Contracting Division (SAF/AQCO) in July 1999, 79 of 85 bases reported 
having a SABER contract in place. Three of the six bases without SABER contracts 
were part of the Air Force Reserve. 
Purpose of SABER 
AFFARS Appendix DD-103(a) states "The purpose of the Air Force SABER 
program is to expedite contract award of civil engineer requirements by reducing civil 
engineer design work and acquisition lead time. SABER is best suited for non-complex, 
minor construction and maintenance and repair projects that require minimum design." 
Benefits of SABER 
There are six benefits that have been identified with successful SABER programs. 
AFFARS Appendix DD and the SABER Guide, developed by the Air Force Logistics 
Management Center and the Air Force Civil Engineering Support Agency, address these 
benefits. 
The first benefit is that the SABER program improves customer service and 
responsiveness. A SABER DO can typically be awarded within four weeks of the 
submission of work request by the Base Civil Engineer (AFFARS DD, 2000:DD- 
103(b)(1)). At Ramstein Air Base, Germany, the average acquisition lead-time, during 
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the period from January 1998 - July 1999, was less than 11 days for DO award. In lieu 
of traditional construction contracting methods, which normally requires a minimum of 
60 days to award, SABER DOs provide the customer with rapid service. 
A second benefit inherent in a successful SABER program is that the contractor 
will be motivated to perform high quality work in a timely manner. The SABER 
contractor is guaranteed a certain minimum dollar amount each year the contract is in 
place. Once this minimum dollar amount is reached, the Government is not required to 
use the SABER contract during that period of performance. Therefore, the contractor 
risks losing additional business if it does not perform high quality work during the 
contract's period of performance (AFFARS DD, 2000:DD-103(b)(2). Poor performance 
also places the contractor at risk of not being renewed for any applicable contract options 
on the existing SABER contract. 
The third benefit is the potential synergy that will be obtained between the base 
contracting office, the civil engineering office, and the contractor. When all three parties 
are team-oriented and maintain an open line of communication, the SABER program will 
be very effective (SABER Guide, 1992:5). This type of environment was established on 
the SABER program at Ramstein Air Base, Germany. The three parties formally met 
once per week to review all open delivery orders, discuss any past discrepancies, and 
forecast upcoming projects that were awaiting funds. 
A fourth benefit of SABER is the ability to accomplish backlogged work orders 
and high-level requirements that require immediate action (SABER Guide, 1992:5). 
SABER can easily accommodate the high-level projects, such as refurbishing the new 
base commander's office, without interrupting in-service work or overextending the 
existing workforce. 
The fifth benefit is that a successful SABER program provides the BCE with 
additional resources to accomplish CEs mission (SABER Guide, 1992:5). This benefit 
has especially been realized since the force reduction experienced throughout the 1990s. 
With the downsized environment, base civil engineering squadrons do not have the 
manpower to accommodate much of the minor construction work it once could handle. 
Furthermore, other situations, like deployments and training, directly affect the mission 
capability of every military unit. SABER provides the BCE with an effective tool to 
manage the overall workload in the civil engineer community. 
The sixth benefit is that the customer (the using organization) has added fiscal 
flexibility (SABER Guide, 1992:5). If a work order, that is SABER eligible is placed on 
a backlog within civil engineering, organizations have the option to fund the project with 
its organizational funds. This provides the organizations with the ability to obtain quality 
work in a responsive, timely fashion. 
SABER Delivery Order (DO) Program 
The execution of SABER contracts is accomplished through the issuance of 
individual delivery orders (DOs). The DO is the formal contractual instrument that 
orders the contractor to perform work under the SABER contract. The contracting officer 
issues SABER DOs once negotiations are completed for the specific work covered in the 
Government's request for proposal. 
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SABER Execution and Administration 
This section provides an overview of the program execution and contract 
administration of the SABER process. The step-by-step process for SABER is detailed in 
AFFARS Appendix DD Part 3. 
Pre-issuance of a Delivery Order 
Once the customer identifies a requirement to CE, CE completes a preliminary 
planning estimate that is then submitted with a statement of work and other required 
documentation to the SABER element within the contracting squadron (AFFARS DD, 
2000:DD-301(a)). The SABER contracting element then issues a request for proposal to 
the contractor on the SABER contract (AFFARS DD, 2000:DD-301(c)). 
Prior to the submission of proposals, a site visit is conducted to allow the 
contractor access to the work area. During the site visit, the contractor, CE project 
manager, contracting officer, and customer will review the requirements of the work to 
be accomplished. Specific items that will be covered during the site visit include the 
method and time requirement for accomplishing the work (AFFARS DD, 2000:DD- 
301(b)). Once the site visit is accomplished, the contractor develops and submits a cost 
proposal for the work. 
Upon receipt of a proposal, the contracting officer and the assigned contract 
administrator review the proposal for completeness, compliance, scope, and 
reasonableness. The contracting officer then requests a technical evaluation of the 
proposal from the CE SABER office (AFFARS DD, 2000:DD-301(d)(l)). 
If the proposal is technically acceptable, the contract administrator will then 
review the proposal's pricing structure to ensure compliance to the contract's pricing 
book (AFFARS DD, 2000:DD-301(d)(2)). Prices not included in the book, known as 
non-priced items (NPI), must be negotiated prior to DO award. Each NPI must be within 
the general scope of the contract (AFFARS DD, 2000:DD-301 (d)(2)). 
If the proposal is not acceptable, the SABER contracting officer may opt to return 
the proposal for rework or send the original work request package back to the Base Civil 
Engineer to determine if the project should be postponed, cancelled, or completed by 
another method (AFFARS DD, 2000:DD-301(d)(3)). 
The contracting officer, CE SABER technical representative, and the contractor 
then negotiate any differences between the contractor's proposal and the government's 
position on the work to be performed. Once all issues are resolved, the contracting officer 
must prepare a price negotiation memorandum (PNM) that covers specific areas relating 
to the project (AFFARS DD, 2000:DD-301 (d)(4)). AFFARS Appendix DD-301(4)(i-iii) 
provides the necessary information that must be included in the PNM. 
Issuance of the Delivery Order 
Following the completion of the PNM and all other required documentation, the 
contracting officer issues a delivery order for the work. The DO is the legal authority 
from the contracting officer to obligate the government to the work identified in the DOs 
statement of work. The DO should include the statement of work, any applicable 
drawings, and a notice to proceed (AFFARS DD, 2000:DD-302(a)). 
Modifications to a Delivery Order 
If, during the course of performance, a legitimate change in work is identified, the 
DO may be modified. Potential changes in work, such as differing site conditions, must 
be within the scope of the original DO. The process of issuing a modification is the same 
as that of issuing a delivery order (AFFARS DD, 2000:DD-302(b)). 
Inspection and Acceptance of Work Completed on a Delivery Order 
In order to ensure satisfactory contractor performance of each delivery order, the 
SABER contracting and SABER CE elements are responsible for a number of actions. 
In accordance with Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) 52.236-1, Performance 
of Work by the Contractor, the contracting officer and administrator are required to 
monitor contractual requirements including the percentage of direct work completed on 
the DO. 
The SABER CE program manager ensures quality assurance inspections are 
performed during the performance period on the DO. Once work is accomplished on the 
DO, the SABER CE program manager, contracting officer and/or administrator, 
contractor, and customer perform a final inspection on the work performed (AFFARS 
DD, 2000:DD-303). If the performance meets DO requirements, the Government accepts 
the work and begins the closeout process (AFFARS DD, 2000:DD-303(c)). If the work 
is unsatisfactory, the Government must determine whether the areas of unacceptable 
performance are minor or major. If the discrepancies are minor, the Government can still 
accept the work. A document, called the punch-list, is created that identifies the minor 
discrepancies and establishes a deadline for the contractor to correct them. If the 
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discrepancies are deemed major, the work is not acceptable. In this situation, the 
contractor must correct the work identified as unacceptable. If the period of performance 
deadline has been reached, the Government has the ability to assess liquidated damages 
on the DO. 
SABER Contract Terms and Options 
As previously stated, SABER contracts are usually awarded for 12 months and 
may contain a maximum of four option years on the contract. AFFARS Appendix DD- 
401 identifies the need for the contracting officer to balance the benefits of increased 
administrative efficiency in exercising SABER contract options and the positive 
performance incentive offered to the current SABER contractor against the added 
economic and market risks that are inherent in extending the contract term. The 
regulation suggests that three option years offer the optimum balance. 
SABER contracts must also contain provisions for making yearly adjustments to 
the option prices listed on the SABER contract. These adjustments can be accomplished 
through two avenues. The first is through the issuance of an updated price book that is 
localized to reflect the current market conditions within the area. The alternative is 
through the use of an economic price adjustment (EPA) clause. The EPA clause includes 
the criteria and predetermined formulas to update the coefficients on the SABER contract 
(AFFARS DD, 2000:DD-402). 
SABER DO Pricing 
Prices on delivery orders are established using the SABER contract's price book 
and the applicable coefficient for the contract line item listed in the SABER contract. 
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Price books contain a majority of the standard work tasks associated with construction. 
Standard unit prices are listed with each work task. The listed price is multiplied by the 
coefficient to obtain a total for the specific DO task. Each contract line item is totaled to 
arrive at the total cost for the DO. 
There are traditionally two types of price books used on SABER contracts. The 
first is a Government-generated Unit Price Book (UPB). The second is a commercially 
available price book. This research identified that the most commonly used commercial 
price book is published by R.S. Means, headquartered in Kingston, MA. 
Unit Price Book 
The Base Civil Engineer prepares the Unit Price Book (UPB) for inclusion with 
the SABER Request for Proposal during the source selection process.   The UPB is a list 
of task specifications unique to the type of work within the contract. Each task 
specification lists a standard unit of measure and standard unit price. For example, a task 
specification may be a specific grade of road paving with a standard unit of measure by 
the square foot with a standard unit price of $25 per square foot. The UPB is localized 
for each SABER contract. Localization involves tailoring the UPB task specification 
information to the specific location of the base the SABER contract is awarded (AFFARS 
DD, 2000:DD-102 (1); DD-202). An example of localization would be an adjustment to 
a line item based on the prevailing wage rate for the particular task, e.g. plumbing, for 
that area. 
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Creating or modifying a UPB is a time-intensive task. There are tens of 
thousands of line items contained in a UPB. For this reason, many bases are opting to 
use a commercially available price book for the contract. 
R.S. Means 
Many Air Force bases have turned to the R.S. Means price book for its SABER 
contract. R.S. Means publishes an annual price book that contains most of the line items 
typically identified in construction efforts. The list prices identify the average cost found 
throughout the United States. Another section of the price book provides locality 
adjustment factors for a large number of cities throughout the country. 
When pricing a SABER DO using the R.S. Means price book, the applicable line 
item is taken from the R.S. Means catalog and multiplied by the catalog's locality 
adjustment factor that corresponds to the base's region. This figure is then multiplied by 
the SABER contractor's coefficient to obtain a total cost for that line item. 
Coefficients 
Coefficients are factors that are multiplied by the price book's standard unit prices 
and result in a cost for the task specification identified in individual DOs. Coefficients 
are calculated and included by the contractor in its initial proposal during the source 
selection process. The contractor considers various internal costs, such as overhead, 
profit, and general and administrative expenses, in determining its proposed coefficients. 
The number of coefficients is developed based on the amount of contract line items in the 
request for proposal. SABER contracts typically include line items for standard and non- 
23 
Standard labor hours, or unique work environments, such as secured areas or isolated site 
work. 
A coefficient of 1.0 indicates that the contractor is performing the contract at the 
exact costs identified within the applicable price book. AFFARS Appendix DD presents 
a case that the offerer's proposed coefficients reflect its perception on the accuracy of the 
price book used on the SABER contract. For example, if the contractor believes the UPB 
prices are consistently lower than the prices actually found in the local area, the 
contractor will bid high coefficients in its proposal. AFFARS Appendix DD argues that 
unbalanced UPBs increase the uncertainty for the contractor in preparing its proposal, 
which increases the possibility of inequitable pricing of SABER contracts. This fact 
stresses the importance of the localization process in developing the UPB. 
Liquidated Damages 
FAR 11.502 establishes the policy on determining when liquidated damages 
clauses should be included in Government contracts. Liquidated damages are normally 
included on SABER contracts. Liquidated damages are applied to individual DOs versus 
the total contract. The SABER contracting officer should assess the need for liquidated 
damages for each delivery order. Areas for consideration should include the total number 
of DOs outstanding and the contractor's ability to control project milestones (AFFARS 
DD, 2000:DD-306(b)). 
If the contractor exceeds the deadline on the period of performance on a DO that 
contains liquidated damages, the contracting officer assesses liquidated damages on the 
delivery order until the project is completed. 
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Project Estimating Fees 
Some SABER contracts include a contract line item, which reimburses the 
contractor for Government-requested proposals, or project estimations, for potential 
SABER work that is eventually not executed. 
The Government normally uses this line item towards the end of the fiscal year. 
In preparation for end of year fall-out money, a number of potential SABER projects will 
be identified and the Government will request a project estimate for the work. If the 
project is not funded within a specified amount of time, the contractor is paid for the cost 
of preparing the estimate, which is identified in the contract. If the project is funded, the 
cost for the preparation is absorbed in the total cost of the delivery order. 
Balanced Workload 
Due to the nature of Government spending, SABER programs and contracts often 
experience a fiscal year 4th quarter surge in use. This period occurs during the months of 
July through September. It is essential for the Government to ensure the SABER 
contractor understands this situation and is prepared for such occurrences. 
An unprepared contractor could be overwhelmed with the amount of work that is 
awarded during this time frame. An effective SABER contractor must have the 
capability to expand and contract its work force to meet such demands. Government 
SABER personnel should also communicate to the contractor any anticipated surges due 
to upcoming events. 
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Inappropriate Use 
There are a number of limitations placed on the issuance of SABER DOs. 
SABER contracts should be used as a complement, not a replacement, to traditional 
construction methods. Specifically, SABER is not an appropriate tool for procuring 
large, complex construction projects that normally require extensive design efforts. In 
addition, SABER is not appropriate for predominantly single skill/material projects 
where other contractual vehicles may be more cost effective (AFFARS DD, 2000:DD- 
104(a)). 
There is a monetary limit of $500,000 that a SABER DO cannot exceed without a 
waiver signed by the base commander. This limitation includes any proposed 
modification to an existing DO. Therefore, the total sum of the delivery order and the 
proposed modification cannot exceed $500,000. In either case, the waiver must be 
approved by the base commander prior to the award of the DO or modification. 
AFFARS Appendix DD-104(c)(l-3) provides the specific information that must be 
included in a waiver package (AFFARS DD, 2000:DD-104(c)). 
There are also limitations placed on Architect-engineer (A-E) services and non- 
personal services. SABER contracts may not be used on most projects that were 
designed using A-E services (AFFARS DD-104(b)). AFFARS Appendix DD- 
104(b)(2)(i-ii) lists the exceptions to this rule. 
SABER is inappropriate for work that is subject to the provisions of the Service 
Contract Act. The Department of Labor has the jurisdiction over whether a particular 
requirement is construction work, therefore subject to the Davis Bacon Act, or service 
work, subject to the Service Contract Act (AFFARS DD, 2000:DD-104(e)). 
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AFFARS Appendix DD also places a limitation on NPIs for each SABER 
delivery order. NPIs shall not exceed ten percent of the total value of the DO without 
prior approval by the base commander. However, this waiver authority for NPIs is only 
applicable to 25 percent of the total value of the DO.    The justification behind this 
limitation is that the need to negotiate a number of NPIs reduces the efficiency of the 
SABER contract (AFFARS DD, 2000:DD- 104(d)). 
Other Areas 
There were a number of issues identified during the interviews that were 
particular to each base's situation. Some of these issues were relevant to the research 
while others were issues that could be further examined. These areas are presented at the 
end of each case study in Chapter IV. 
Summary 
Chapter II provided a literature review on the current literature available 
regarding the SABER program. Chapter III, Methodology, will provide the research 
methodology used in collecting the data to meet the research objective. Chapter IV, 
Analysis, will present the data gathered during the interviews. Chapter V, Results and 
Conclusions, will provide the results from the research as well as any conclusions that 
can be made based on the research data collected. 
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III. Methodology 
Chapter III presents the methodology that was used to acquire and analyze the 
data for this research effort. 
Overview 
The objective of this research effort was to identify and analyze any conditions 
that may have been created by the current SABER acquisition process that led to SABER 
contractor failures. There were no anticipated results prior to conducting the research and 
data collection. The acquisition process for any Government contract, in this case 
SABER contracts, is extensive. A number of processes and procedures are incorporated 
into the Government's acquisition process. The major processes within a SABER 
acquisition include the source selection process, the contract award process, and the 
contract performance process. Each process can be further segmented into additional 
processes. For instance, the source selection process can be separated into the process of 
selecting a source selection team, the process of creating evaluation criteria for evaluation 
purposes, and the process of determining whether limitations will be placed on a bidders' 
proposal. 
Due to this inherent nature of the Government acquisition process, the task of 
attempting to identify problem areas within the overall process without focusing on an 
area or a number of specific areas is nearly impossible. For this reason, the scope of this 
research was narrowed to one overall research question with five specific subsidiary 
research questions within the SABER acquisition process. The research question 
developed was: 
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Are there any Government-controlled factors of the SABER acquisition process 
that are leading to contractor failure during the contract's period of performance? 
The five subsidiary research questions selected for this research effort were: 
(1) What was the Government's method of pricing the SABER contract? Did this 
pricing method negatively impact the contractor's ability to satisfactorily 
perform? 
(2) What role, if applicable, did liquidated damages have during the performance 
of the SABER contract? Did the assessment of liquidated damages, when 
applied, negatively impact the contractor's ability to satisfactorily perform on 
existing and future SABER DOs? 
(3) Does the Government reimburse the contractor for the cost of preparing a bid 
for a project that is eventually not executed? If not, did this practice negatively 
impact the contractor's ability to satisfactorily perform on the contract? 
(4) How does the Government balance the issuance of SABER delivery orders 
over the course of the contract period? Where there any surges, particularly in the 
fiscal year 4th quarter, that negatively impacted the SABER contractor's ability to 
satisfactorily perform? 
(5) Was there any inappropriate use of the SABER contract? If so, did this 
negatively impact the contractor's ability to satisfactorily perform? 
Method Selection 
As stated in Chapter 1, Research Methodology, a qualitative methodology was 
used to conduct the research. Specifically, the case study methodology was selected as 
the most beneficial way to meet the objective of the research. 
Yin identified three conditions to assist a researcher in determining the type of 
research strategy to use for a research topic (Yin, 1994:4-6). Yin also provided a table, 
Table 1, which identifies five resource strategies along with the three conditions (Yin, 
1994:6). 
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Experiment how, why yes yes 
Survey 









History how, why no no 
Case study how, why no yes 
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The underlying question of this research concerned "why" or "how" these 
SABER contractors are failing. There was no attempt to control behavioral events and 
the research focused on contemporary events. Therefore, the appropriate strategy for this 
research was case study analysis. 
Yin defined a case study as "...an empirical inquiry that investigates a 
contemporary phenomenon within the real-life context, especially when the boundaries 
between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident" (Yin, 1994:13). 
Based on the recommendation of Yin, the process used for this research effort was 
broken into four stages. These stages entail the: 
-    design of the case study; 
performance of the case study; 
analysis of the case study evidence; 
development of the conclusions and recommendations. 
Design of the Case Study 
Given the objective of this research, the design of the case study targeted specific 
SABER contracts. Seven Air Force bases were selected as case study subjects by the 
researcher and the researcher's sponsors, SAF/AQCO and AFIT/CEM. The seven bases 
represent three Major Commands throughout three states in the continental United States 
(CONUS). The three states cover the eastern and southern CONUS. The three states are 
geographically separated in an effort to reduce any regional effects on the data collected. 
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Of the seven bases selected, three bases terminated their SABER contractor for 
default, one base terminated for convenience, one base identified the contract as failing, 
and the remaining two bases did not have SABER contractors in a failed or failing 
situation. 
Yin identified six sources of evidence used in case study research (Yin, 1994:79 ■ 
90). Table 2 presents the six sources alongside the strengths and weaknesses of each 
source. 
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Table 2. The Six Sources of Evidence Identified by Yin 
Source of Evidence Strengths Weaknesses 
Documentation 
stable, unobtrusive, exact, 
broad coverage (wide span of 
events) 
retrievability, biased 
selectivity (if collection 
is not complete), 
reporting bias, access 
Archival records 
same as above 
precise and quantitative 
-    same as above 
accessibility due to 
privacy reasons 
Interviews 
-    targeted (focused on specific 
topic), insightful 
-    bias due to poorly 
constructed questions, 
response bias, 
inaccuracies due to 
poor recall, reflexivity 
Direct observations 







same as above for direct 
observations, insightful into 
interpersonal behavior and 
motives 
same as above for 
direct observations, 
bias due to 
investigator's 
manipulation of events 
Physical artifacts 
insightful into cultural features 
and technical operations 
selectivity, availability 
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The primary source of evidence used in this research effort was interviews. 
Interviews provided the researcher with the ability to gain insightful information on each 
base's SABER process. Another benefit of the interview was the ability to focus the 
interview on the individual situation specific to each base. 
A questionnaire was developed for preparation and guidance for conducting the 
interviews. The questionnaire was separated into questions dealing with the SABER 
background information for pre-award and post-award as well as a number of specific 
questions related to the execution of the SABER contract. The questionnaire can be 
found in Appendix B, Field Visit and Interview Guide. The questions were developed by 
the researcher, the researcher's advisor, and coordinated through the researcher's 
sponsors. The questionnaire was sent to each base prior to conducting the interview. 
The second source of evidence was the collection of copies of documentation. 
Each base maintains a contract file that contains all relevant information regarding the 
SABER contract. Yin states "For case studies, the most important use of documents is to 
corroborate and augment evidence from other sources" (Yin, 1994:81).   In this research 
effort, the collection of documentation, when necessary, supported the statements made 
by the interviewees. 
Limitations of the Research 
There are a number of limitations to this research effort. The SABER contractor 
was not contacted during the data collection process. The rationale for this decision was 
two-fold. The primary rationale was due to potential legal issues between the 
Government and the contractor in a failed situation. One of the case studies involved the 
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Situation where the Government was at the initial stages of a failed situation. In addition, 
a number of case studies involved situations where the contractor was no longer in the 
local area of the base.   These situations involved contractors that had gone out of 
business. The decision not to interview the contractor will limit the overall analysis, as 
the research will only collect one side of the story in each case study. 
Other areas of concern in this area included the rapid turnover of Government 
personnel. In some cases, the individuals who were part of the SABER source selection 
process were no longer at that base due to change of assignments or separation from 
Government service. This impacted the ability of the current personnel to provide 
background information regarding various aspects of the base's SABER contract. 
Validity and Reliability of the Research 
Four tests that are commonly used by researchers to address the quality of any 
empirical research study include construct validity, internal validity, external validity, 
and reliability. Yin provides a table, Table 3, of these four tests along with a case study 
tactic and the phase to use this tactic in an effort to strengthen the applicable test (Yin, 
1994:33). 
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Table 3. Case Study Tactics for Four Design Tests 
(Yin, 1994:33) 
Tests 
Case study tactic 
Phase of research in which 
tactic occurs 
Construct validity 
use multiple sources of 
evidence 
establish chain of 
evidence 
have key informants 
review draft case study 
report 
- data collection 










-    use replication or logic 
in multiple-case studies 
-    research design 
Reliability 
-    use case study protocol 
develop case study data 
base 
data collection 
-    data collection 
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Construct Validity 
Yin described construct validity as "...establishing correct operational measures 
for the concepts being studied." (Yin, 1994:33-34). In an effort to strengthen the 
construct validity of this research, two sources of evidence, interviews and 
documentation, were selected in lieu of just one or the other. The use of these two 
sources compliments each other. The documentation gathered supported the responses 
provided during the interview. In addition, the interview provided the researcher with a 
number of details that documentation could not provide, such as the political environment 
that existed during the SABER contract's period of performance. 
Internal Validity 
Internal validity, as described by Yin, is establishing a causal relationship versus a 
false, or spurious, relationship from the research data (Yin, 1994:33,35). Each case study 
subject had the opportunity to review the case study data prior to its inclusion into this 
study. The purpose of this review was to ensure that the researcher accurately portrayed 
the information and the meaning of that information provided by the contracting and civil 
engineering personnel. 
The research effort was geared towards establishing a potential causal relationship 
based on any Government action that led to the failure on the part of the SABER 
contractor. The coding process, as explained below, was designed in an effort to 




Yin identified external validity as "...establishing the domain to which a study's 
findings can be generalized." (Yin, 1994:33, 35-36). To strengthen external validity, the 
same research design was replicated for each of the seven case studies. 
This research focused on five aspects of the overall SABER acquisition process as 
potential conditions that may have led to SABER contractor failure. However, the 
questionnaire included a number of questions regarding the wide spectrum of the SABER 
acquisition process. This research could be replicated with a number of other bases not 
used in this research. 
Reliability 
Yin stated, "The objective is to be sure that, if a later investigator followed 
exactly the same procedures as described by an earlier investigator and conducted the 
same case study all over again, the later investigator should arrive at the same findings 
and conclusions." (Yin, 1994:33, 36-37). 
The reliability test has been addressed throughout Chapter 3. The design of this 
research was geared to allow future researchers to use the same protocol and obtain the 
same results. 
Execution of the Case Study 
Coordination for the case studies was through SAF/AQCO and each MAJCOMs 
contracting point of contact for SABER contracts. A copy of Appendix A, First Contact 
with Primary Point of Contact, was sent to each base prior to the interview. Upon arrival 
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at each Air Force base, the initial meeting was with the Contracting Squadron's 
commander or deputy commander when that individual was available. 
Following this initial meeting, interviews were conducted with the Contracting 
Squadron's SABER contracting officer and SABER contract administrator(s). These 
individuals compose the contracting portion of the SABER program. In addition to the 
contracting personnel, interviews were held with five of the seven bases' SABER civil 
engineer personnel. 
The interview process was semi-structured. Interviews covered specific topics 
related to the five subsidiary research questions. In addition, the interviews addressed a 
number of additional areas relating to the SABER acquisition process. These questions, 
as identified in Appendix B, were identified as potential areas for future research in this 
area. 
Several of the case studies involved situations where the SABER contractor failed 
in the performance of the contract. In these situations, the focus of the interview was 
directed at the circumstances, as determined by the interviewees, which led to the 
contractor failure. 
Prior to the interview, each interviewee was provided an overview of the research 
effort. Each interview was audiotaped to allow the researcher to review the information 
prior to documenting each case study. All subjects were questioned prior to conducting 
the interview concerning their preference not to be audiotaped; no one declined. 
Interviewees were assured of their and their base's anonymity and were asked to be direct 
and truthful during the interview. The case study analysis was provided to both the 
39 
contracting and civil engineering personnel for comments and concerns prior to this 
publishing. 
Analysis of the Case Study Evidence 
The researcher gathered a large quantity of data during the execution phase of the 
research effort. A total of seven case studies were performed over a two-week period. In 
addition to the large amount of documentation collected, there were numerous hours of 
audiotape to review for this effort. To identify whether there were any conditions created 
by the Government in the SABER acquisition process that led to the SABER contractor's 
failure was likened to finding the proverbial needle in the haystack. Novak addressed 
such a dilemma by stating: 
We moved to the use almost exclusively of interviews...but then we were faced 
with numerous audiotapes or typed transcripts of the tapes. It was exceedingly 
difficult to analyze these records and find patterns or regularities that could help 
us understand how and why... (Novak, 1998:27). 
Faced with a similar situation, a process was needed to code the data into a 
manageable form. The researcher used a process espoused by Strauss and Corbin 
(Strauss and Corbin, 1990). Strauss and Corbin describe three stages of coding that was 
used in this research effort. 
Stage one involved open coding, which is the process of breaking down and 
conceptualizing the data gathered. 
Stage two, known as axial coding, involves the process of conducting a cross-case 
analysis of all data relevant to the research effort. For this research effort, axial coding 
consisted of identifying all data relevant to each of the five subsidiary research questions. 
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Finally, the third stage, called selective coding, involved identifying any common 
data found throughout the case studies and determining whether the data impacted the 
SABER contractor's ability to satisfactorily perform on the SABER contract. 
To document the coding process, the researcher used a technique called mind- 
mapping (Buzan and Buzan, 1993:59). The mind-map is a manifestation of radiant 
thinking. Radiant thinking involves the process of creating ideas and thoughts from a 
central point. These thoughts burst out from the central point. The mind-map is the 
written expression of radiant thinking (Buzan and Buzan, 1993:53-69). The use of a 
mind-map encourages radiant thinking in place of linear or hierarchical thinking. 
Figure 1 contains the mind-map used for this research effort. The central point, 
Government-controlled actions or procedures that impact contractor performance, 
represented the central theme of the research effort: are there any Government-controlled 
factors that led to the SABER contractor's failure? Five of the six main themes 
corresponded to the five subsidiary research questions. The final theme-Other areas 
identified during case studies-represented additional information gathered during the 
case study execution that was pertinent to the situation. Opportunities for future research 
efforts are identified from this theme. 
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Figure 1. Mind Map Designed for the Research Effort 
Organization of the Remaining Report 
Chapter IV, Analysis, reports the findings of each case study. Each case study 
was documented in the following manner: 
Base X Analysis 
Background Information - This section introduces the case study. Items 
presented include the relevant facts of the SABER contract. Such facts include 
the amount and period of the SABER contract. 
Five Areas Relating to the Subsidiary Questions - A section is dedicated to 
discuss, in detail, the responses to the five subsidiary questions that the research 
targeted. The titles of each section are Pricing Methodology, Liquidated 
Damages, Project Estimating Fees, Balanced Work, and Inappropriate Use. 
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Other Areas - As previously identified, this section identifies relevant issues, 
excluding the five targeted areas, pertaining to each bases situation. 
Chapter IV also provides a cross-case analysis of the seven case studies. 
Comparisons are made across the board for each of the six themes identified in the mind- 
map. The purpose of this cross-referencing was to identify whether the five areas were 
consistent with one another. This allowed a comparison to whether the case studies that 
resulted in a failed situation were any different to those case studies that were not in a 
failed situation. This comparison assisted in identifying whether the specific area, e.g. 
Use of liquidated damages, was a relevant factor in the failure of the SABER contractors 
at different bases. 
Chapter V, Results and Conclusions, states the results from the research. In 
addition, Chapter V identifies future research efforts. These topics were identified during 
the interview and data collection process as potential candidates of causal relationships 
regarding Government-controlled actions that may lead to SABER contractor failure. 
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IV. Analysis 
Chapter IV is separated into two sections. The first section provides an in-depth 
case study analysis on each installation's SABER program. The analysis focuses on the 
five subsidiary research questions as well as any other areas of interest that were 
identified during the interview and field visit. The second section of Chapter 4 contains a 
cross-case review of the six areas in an effort to identify any trends across the seven 
installations studied during this research effort. 
Overview 
Each analysis is covered separately and is identified as Base A through Base G. 
Each case study analysis consists of a brief summation on the background information of 
the SABER program at the base studied. The next portion of the analysis is dedicated to 
each of the five subsidiary research questions in the following order: Pricing 
Methodology, Liquidated Damages, Project Estimating Fees, Balanced Work, and 
Inappropriate Use. Following this is a section, Other Areas, which provides additional 
areas of interest that were identified during the case study interviews. Each case study 
write-up was provided to the respective installations for review of content and accuracy 
prior to publishing. 
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Base A Analysis 
Background Information. The SABER contract at Base A was established for a 
maximum of five years, base period with four option periods, with a set minimum dollar 
amount of $200,000 and a maximum dollar amount of $5,000,000 per period of 
performance. 
Nine contractors bid for the contract during the source selection period. There 
were no 8(a) small business set-asides for this contract. The contract was awarded to a 
large firm that had SABER contracts at other bases as well as substantial experience in 
construction contracting with the Air Force. 
The contract was approximately five weeks into its third option period when a 
high-level executive for the contractor informed the base contracting squadron 
commander and the SABER personnel that the contractor would close operations within 
30 days. 
Within its letter of notification, the contractor identified that a criminal action, 
embezzlement, by one of its employees resulted in the financial insolvency of the firm. 
The contractor also informed the Government personnel that the contractor's employees 
and subcontractors would be immediately notified of the situation. 
In time, the contractor was terminated for default and the bonding company took 
over the open delivery orders on the work that had not been completed. 
Base contracting personnel stated that the contractor performed satisfactorily on 
the contract prior to this incident. They also stated that the contract probably would have 
been renewed for the fourth option period if this incident did not occur. 
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Pricing Methodology. The SABER contract's pricing structure was based from 
the RS Means database. The RS Means book was updated annually. The contractor was 
required to procure the annual updates and provide copies to both base contracting and 
civil engineering personnel. 
The contract had four coefficients for four contract line items for each period of 
performance. Two coefficients were for standard working hours for two separate 
locations, the base and an additional facility not physically attached to the base. The 
remaining two coefficients were for non-standard working hours for the same two 
locations. The contract identified standard working hours. 
The contractor proposed negative coefficients for each of the contract line items. 
A contractor who quotes a negative coefficient, which is below 1.0, is proposing that the 
work can be accomplished by the contractor at less than the contract pricing book costs 
including any locality adjustment for that contract's area. Base civil engineering 
personnel expressed concern regarding this fact. One inspector questioned whether 
SABER contracts should be awarded to any contractor that proposes a negative 
coefficient. 
Despite the fact that the contract was awarded to a firm that proposed negative 
coefficients, it does not appear that the Government's action in this area negatively 
impacted the contractor's performance thereby resulting in the contractor failing. 
Liquidated Damages. The liquidated damages clause was used on each SABER 
delivery order. The amount of liquidated damages was approximately $140 per day 
beyond the expiration date of the delivery order. 
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Contracting personnel stated that liquidated damages were not assessed 
extensively on the contract. In addition, the contracting officer stated that there appeared 
to be no domino effect that affected other open delivery orders once liquidated damages 
were assessed on an individual delivery order. The following scenario provides an 
example of domino effect. The SABER contractor is being assessed liquidated damages 
against DO 1. To alleviate the situation, the contractor moves personnel from DO 2 and 
DO 3 to DO 1 to finish the work. Due to the personnel shift, the contractor then falls 
behind and is assessed liquidated damages on DO 2 and DO 3. 
The contracting officer further identified that the contractor never provided 
negative feedback that the assessment of liquidated damages on an individual delivery 
negatively impacted its ability to perform on any outstanding delivery orders. 
It does not appear that the Government's use of liquidated damages negatively 
impacted the contractor's ability to perform satisfactorily on the contract. 
Project Estimating Fees. The SABER contract contained a contract line item for 
a project estimating fee. The shelf life for the project estimating proposals was one year. 
If the DO was awarded, the cost for preparing the proposal was absorbed into the overall 
cost of the awarded DO. This line item was used less than 10 times over the period of the 
contract. The contracting officer noted that the line item could have been used more 
often. However, the contractor voluntarily provided a majority of project estimations at 
no cost to the Government. These free estimates were provided on projects awaiting 
fiscal end of year fall-out funding. 
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It does not appear that the contractor's failure to charge the Government for 
project estimations negatively impacted their ability to perform satisfactorily on the 
contract. 
Balanced Work. Throughout each period of performance, the SABER contractor 
experienced a fiscal year 4th quarter surge as a result of the Government committing 
dollars prior to losing them on 1 October. 
The contracting officer stated that the contractor never expressed concern that the 
workload was overwhelming. Furthermore, the contractor never attempted to refuse any 
projects during the contract performance period. 
It does not appear that 4th quarter surges negatively impacted the contractor's 
ability to perform in a satisfactory manner. 
Inappropriate Use. Based on current government laws and AFFARS Appendix 
DD limitations, the contracting personnel did not identify any attempts of inappropriate 
use, of the SABER contract at Base A. However, the civil engineering personnel 
expressed concern that the SABER program has turned into an inappropriate program to 
quickly obligate end of year funds on projects that may have been better suited for 
individual competitive procurements. 
It does not appear that the Government's actions in this area negatively impacted 
the contractor's ability to perform satisfactorily. 
Other Areas. There were a number of areas of concern identified by contracting 
and civil engineering personnel during the interview process. 
Contracting personnel stated that the dollar expenditures on the SABER contract 
have decreased over the years. Two speculations on the root cause of this reduction were 
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identified. First, the decreasing DoD budget has negatively affected a majority of the 
programs and the program's expenditure levels. Second, the Air Force contracting 
squadron on Base A faces procurement competition from the Navy and Army. The Navy 
maintains a three-person office on Base A and actively pursues Air Force business on the 
base. In addition, an Army post is located within 30 minutes of Base A. The Army 
contracting office has a JOC contract in place that Base A has used in the past and is 
currently using until a new SABER contract is in place. There are no firm cost figures on 
how much potential SABER business has been placed through the Navy or Army 
contracting offices. 
A second area of interest identified was the need for personnel to attend source 
selection classes prior to entering a SABER source selection. Civil engineering 
personnel identified a number of courses offered through the Army that prepares 
individuals for source selections. 
A third area of interest that was identified by civil engineering personnel 
involved a claim that the subcontractors were not getting paid in a timely manner. This 
resulted in the subcontractors abandoning some sites and refusing to work for the prime 
contractor on future projects. The prime contractor was then forced to hire less qualified 
workers. This resulted in low quality workmanship. 
Base B Analysis 
Background Information. The SABER contract at Base B was established for a 
maximum of five years, base period with four options. The contract had a minimum 
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dollar amount of $200,000 and a maximum dollar amount of $4,000,000 per period of 
performance. 
There were a total of 10 bidders that submitted proposals for the SABER contract. 
There were no 8(a) small business set-asides for this contract. The contract was awarded 
to a large firm that had SABER contract experience on other Air Force bases. 
The contract was awarded in May 1997 and was used infrequently during the first 
year. This was the second SABER contract awarded on Base B. The contracting officer 
stated that the SABER program was not initially wanted on Base B. Base B is located in 
close proximity to an Army post and the Air Force was using the Army JOC contract 
prior to the implementation of the SABER program. However, Base Bs MAJCOM 
mandated that a SABER contract be put in place. The use of SABER did increase 
following the initial period of performance in 1997. 
In the third option period, problems arose with the SABER contractor. The 
contractor experienced a large surge in delivery orders due to preparations for a major Air 
Force training exercise. This situation is covered in detail under Balanced Workload. 
In addition, the contractor had major difficulties obtaining subcontractors for 
projects. This resulted in the contractor having limited capability to manage its 
workload. The contracting officer stated that the contractor could only handle two DOs 
at a time. 
A week before the field visit, the SABER contracting officer issued three cure 
notices and one show cause letter to the contractor for delinquent work. 
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Pricing Methodology. Base B used the RS Means database to price DOs on its 
SABER contract. The contractor was required to procure annual updates and provide 
copies to both base contracting and civil engineering personnel. 
The contract had three coefficients for three working level contract line items. 
One coefficient was for regular working hours; one for non-regular working hours; and a 
third for concentrated work. Concentrated work included work that involved unexpected 
mission changes, extremely short performance periods, or damage repair as a result of a 
natural or unnatural disaster. 
The contractor proposed negative coefficients for each of the contract line items. 
The coefficients ranged from 0.88 for regular working hours to 0.918 for both non- 
regular working hours and concentrated work. 
The contracting officer stated that both the Government and the contractor were 
comfortable with using the R.S. Means price book on the contract. It does not appear that 
the Government's action in this area negatively impacted the contractor's ability to 
perform satisfactorily on the SABER contract. 
Liquidated Damages. The liquidated damages clause was applied to every 
delivery order valued over $25,000. The use of the liquidated damages clause for orders 
under $25,000 was made on a case-by-case basis. 
The contracting officer stated that there had never been a monetary assessment of 
liquidated damages prior to the interview. However, the assessment of liquidated 
damages on open DOs was imminent due to the contractor's inability to perform in a 
timely manner. In a few instances, the Government took non-monetary consideration in 
lieu of money on orders that went beyond the DO expiration date. 
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Since liquidated damages were not assessed on the contract, the contractor's 
ability to perform satisfactorily could not have been negatively impacted. 
Project Estimating Fees. The SABER contract contained a line item for project 
estimations. The cost of the estimation was based on the magnitude of the project. For 
projects with an estimated total of $25,000 or less, the project estimating fee was $500; 
project magnitude estimations between $25,000 to $100,000 cost $800; and estimates that 
were over $100,000 cost $1,200. 
The project estimating line item was used infrequently and only during 
preparation for end of fiscal year fall-out. The shelf life for the estimation was one year. 
The contracting personnel did not mention any instances where the contractor provided 
project estimations at no cost to the Government. 
There does not appear to be any evidence to support the Government actions in 
this area negatively impacted the contractor's ability to perform satisfactorily on the 
SABER contract. 
Balanced Work. As previously stated, the SABER contract was used infrequently 
during the first period of performance. As the base prepared for a high-level Air Force 
exercise for 2000, the SABER contractor experienced a large surge in the amount of 
work awarded. Most of this work consisted of facility renovation and improvement 
projects. 
In addition, the contracting officer noted that a number of interested personnel 
directly contacted the contractor to emphasize the importance of the DOs related to the 
exercise. Individuals went so far as to prioritize the work without the contracting 
officer's knowledge that such actions were taking place. 
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The contracting officer noted that this situation resulted in the contractor falling 
behind schedule on DOs not associated with the exercise. Following the surge, the 
contracting officer gave the contractor the opportunity to adjust performance periods on 
uncompleted DOs. The DOs were modified to reflect the adjusted periods. However, the 
contracting officer noted that the contractor did not recover from that period. 
Although the contractor was not in default at the time of the data collection, the 
actions of the Government in this matter negatively impacted the contractor's ability to 
perform satisfactorily on the contract. 
Inappropriate Use. There had been previous attempts to use the contract for 
work, such as single-trade projects, that is inappropriate for a SABER contract. The 
SABER contracting officer refused to issue SABER delivery orders on the work and the 
requirements were sent back to the customer or forwarded to another branch of the 
contracting office to handle appropriately. 
It does not appear that the Government's actions in this area negatively impacted 
the contractor's ability to perform satisfactorily. 
Other Areas. The existence of competition for work on Base B is evident. With 
SABER in place, Air Force customers no longer use the Army JOC contract. However, 
the Army does compete for work on Base B. The Army Corps of Engineers has an office 
on Base B. A number of projects that were SABER eligible were given to the Corps of 
Engineers. For example, the Corps of Engineers had all of the base's runway projects 
and a number of base housing projects. 
The contracting officer also noted that the SABER contractor had difficulty hiring 
reliable subcontractors to work on the SABER contract. This was due to the large 
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amount of construction projects at the Army post that is located near Base B. The 
contracting officer believed the limited number of qualified subcontractors negatively 
impacted the contractor's ability to handle more than two delivery orders at any given 
time. This resulted in potential SABER projects being procured under traditional 
construction contracting methods versus being awarded as a SABER delivery order. 
Base C Analysis 
Background Information. The SABER contract at Base C was established for a 
maximum of five years, base period with four option periods, with a set minimum dollar 
amount of $200,000 per period of performance with a maximum dollar amount of 
$15,000,000 over the life of the contract. 
A total of 13 contractors placed a bid for the contract during the source selection 
process. This was not an 8(a) small business set-aside contract. The contract was 
awarded to a large firm that had SABER contracts at other bases as well as substantial 
experience in construction contracting with the Air Force. 
The contractor at Base C was also the firm that was awarded the SABER contract 
at Base A. As with Base A, the SABER contract was in its third option period when the 
contractor defaulted on the contract. The contracting officer noted that the contractor was 
performing satisfactorily on the contract. The third option had just been exercised when 
the default situation occurred. 
Pricing Methodology. R.S. Means was the price book used on this SABER 
contract. The contractor was required to procure annual updates and provide copies to 
the SABER contracting and civil engineering offices. 
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The contract contained four coefficients per period of performance. The 
coefficients were for standard and non-standard hours for two separate locations, the base 
and an additional facility not physically attached to the base. 
The coefficients during the first two periods of performance were negative. The 
coefficients applicable to projects completed on base were 0.921 for standard hours and 
0.983 for non-standard hours during the initial contract period. The coefficients during 
the first option period were 0.926 and 0.988 respectively. 
Prior to the execution of the third option period, a contract modification was done 
which increased the coefficients for option year 2 and subsequent periods. The 
coefficients for projects on base rose 0.063, 0.058, and 0.053 for standard working hours 
for option periods 2, 3, and 4. Similar increases were applied to the remaining 
coefficients. There was no documented justification or consideration for this 
modification. However, contracting personnel noted that the price increases within the 
modification did not displace any other bidder and was given legal review prior to 
approval. 
Since the contractor failed due to an internal criminal action, there is no evidence 
that conclusively supports that the Government's actions negatively impacted the 
contractor's ability to satisfactorily perform. However, the modification to raise 
coefficients without consideration suggests that the Government was possibly attempting 
to right a wrong by raising the coefficients to allow the contractor to recover past losses. 
One could only speculate whether the contractor would continue to satisfactorily perform 
given this situation. 
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Liquidated Damages. Liquidated damages were assessed on a number of delivery 
orders throughout the life of the contract. Contracting personnel stated that there 
appeared to be no domino effect when liquidated damages were assessed. 
It does not appear that the Government's use of liquidated damages negatively 
impacted the contractor's ability to satisfactorily perform the contract. 
Project Estimating Fees. The SABER contract contained project estimating line 
items. The cost of the estimation was based on the magnitude of the project. Estimations 
for projects less than $25,000 cost $1,200; for projects between $25,000 and $100,000, 
the cost for the estimation was $1,750; and for projects greater than $100,000, the cost for 
the estimation was $3,000. These costs were the same for each period of performance. 
Project estimations had a shelf life of one year. 
Data provided by the contracting personnel identified 15 occasions that the 
project estimating line item was used. All 15 uses were for preparation of fiscal year-end 
fallout. The contracting personnel did not mention any instances where the contractor 
provided project estimations at no cost to the Government. 
There does not appear to be any evidence to support that the Government's 
actions in this area negatively impacted the contractor's ability to satisfactorily perform. 
Balanced Work. On data collected from the contracting personnel, a majority of 
the SABER workload was awarded during the fiscal year 4th quarter. Approximately 65 
percent of 113 delivery orders reviewed were awarded during the 4th quarter. 
The SABER contracting personnel noted that the contractor had not expected the 
large surge in delivery orders during the 4th quarter. Furthermore, the local area did not 
have the infrastructure, specifically the manpower, needed to handle so much work at any 
56 
given time. Government personnel had to work with the contractor to establish schedules 
of performance on each delivery order that was fair for both the contractor and the 
customer. 
Although the amount of work was unexpected, the Government and contractor 
worked around this issue to avoid future problems. Therefore, it does not appear that 41 
quarter surges negatively impacted the contractor's ability to perform in a satisfactory 
manner. 
Inappropriate Use. The contracting officer noted that there were no incidents of 
inappropriate use of the SABER contract. Therefore, there was no potential negative 
impact on the contractor's ability to perform. 
Other Areas. A new SABER contract was in place at Base C during the field 
visit. One concern identified regarding the new contract is the price book. The R.S. 
Means book is being used on the new SABER contract. The contract was awarded to a 
large construction firm with significant Air Force SABER experience at other bases. All 
of the contractor's coefficients are positive. One possible explanation of a positive 
coefficient proposed within a bid indicates that the contractor believes the R.S. Means 
prices are slightly lower than the market prices surrounding the area. The closest city 
listed in the R.S. Means City Cost Index (CCI) is over 60 miles away. The contracting 
officer believes that local costs are higher than the adjusted CCI price. The contractor 
has provided feedback to the contracting officer regarding the discrepancy between the 
price book and actual local costs. The contractor claims that they are losing money more 
often than making a profit on many delivery orders. 
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The contracting officer further stated that he believed the price differences are 
negatively affecting the contractor's ability to meet the cost of the work under the 
contract. 
Base D Analysis 
Background Information. The SABER contract researched at Base D was 
awarded as an 8(a) set-aside for a period of one year. The contract was awarded 
following a series of capabilities briefings of the six best qualified contractors as 
identified by the Small Business Administration (SBA).   Following the six briefings, 
SABER civil engineering and contracting personnel selected the best-rated contractor. 
The contract was awarded in June 1999 for a minimum dollar amount of $100,000 
and a maximum amount of $3,000,000. At that time, the contractor selected already had 
two other SABER contracts as well as significant experience with other construction 
projects. 
In selecting this SABER contractor, traditional source selection procedures were 
not used. The previous SABER contractor, a large firm, was not renewed for a second 
option term leaving the Government with little time to conduct a SABER source 
selection. Under the circumstances, the contracting officer opted to award a one-year 
SABER contract through the SBA. This approach allowed the Government the necessary 
time to conduct a normal source selection. Unfortunately, this would not happen. 
In early April 2000, the contractor notified the contracting officer at Base D that 
the contractor was having financial problems. The contractor claimed it had over 
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$1,300,000 in accounts receivable from its customers. The contractor was also having 
difficulty with its SABER contract at Base E. 
On 20 July 2000, the SABER contractor's president notified the contracting 
officer at Base D that the company filed for bankruptcy and all work would be halted. At 
this time, the contract at Base D had expired; however, there were 17 open delivery 
orders that needed to be completed. Eventually, the contracting officer terminated for 
default each delivery order. 
Pricing Methodology. Base D used the R.S. Means book for pricing delivery 
orders. Previous SABER contracts on Base D used locally developed unit price books. 
Contracting and civil engineer personnel agreed to change to the R.S. Means book in lieu 
of attempting to update the locally developed unit price book. The contractor was 
familiar with the R.S. Means pricing book since it used R.S. Means on its other SABER 
contracts. 
The contract's coefficient for standard work hours was 1.169. Prior to award, 
Base Ds MAJCOM provided pricing assistance to the source selection team and verified 
that the coefficient proposed would cover the contractor's expenses. 
There does not appear to be any Government action in this area that negatively 
impacted the contractor's ability to perform satisfactorily on the contract. 
Liquidated Damages. The liquidated damages clause was included on each 
delivery order. The amount of liquidated damages varied dependent on mission impact. 
The contracting officer stated that liquidated damages were never assessed against the 
contractor on this contract. 
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Since liquidated damages were not assessed on the contract, the contractor's 
ability to perform satisfactorily could not have been negatively impacted. 
Project Estimating Fees. The SABER contract did not contain a project 
estimating fee line item. The contractor voluntarily provided end of fiscal year estimates 
under a hold harmless agreement. The agreement stated that the contractor 
acknowledged the fact that the project requested under the Government's request for 
proposal may not be executed and the costs for preparing the estimate were not 
reimbursable. The contracting officer stated that all of the projects under this agreement 
were executed; therefore, the contractor did not suffer a loss of revenue from preparing 
estimates that were not executed. 
There does not appear to be any evidence to support that the Government's 
actions in this area negatively impacted the contractor's ability to satisfactorily perform. 
Balanced Work. A total of 22 delivery orders were awarded on the contract. Of 
the 22, 13 orders were awarded in the 4th quarter of the fiscal year 1999. Government 
personnel had some concern regarding the contractor's ability to handle the workload. 
SABER civil engineering and contracting personnel identified customers' 
requirements and worked with the contractor to establish a balanced schedule. However, 
the contracting officer stated the fact that the contractor could not keep up with the work 
and suggested that the Government may have overextended the contractor during this 
time period. 
The civil engineering SABER chief disagreed and suggested that the contractor 
grew too fast too soon. At the time, the contractor had four other major contracts 
including two SABER contracts with other bases, a local school district contract, and a 
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contract with the Army Corps of Engineers. The CE SABER chief inferred that the 
contractor's management could not handle the rapid growth the company experienced in 
a brief amount of time. 
Given this information, there existed some possibility that the Government's 
actions may have negatively affected the contractor's ability to perform satisfactorily. 
The Government's actions do not appear to be the result of a single installation's actions, 
but possibly a cumulative effect from the surge experienced by each contract during the 
fiscal end of year surge. However, field visits were also completed at the two 
installations where the contractor had SABER contracts, Base E and Base G. 
Due to a protest following the award at Base E, actual performance on the 
SABER contract did not begin until the first quarter, fiscal year 2000.   In addition, 
performance on the SABER contract at Base G was concluding at this time. There was 
no data gathered from the school district or the Army Corps of Engineers. However, any 
cumulative effect by the Government that negatively impacted the contractor's ability to 
satisfactorily perform that is based solely on the number of contracts cannot be 
established. 
In addition, the contractor was not required to accept all work submitted as 
SABER projects. The contracting officer noted that the contractor did not refuse any 
work submitted under the SABER contract. 
Therefore, there is no evidence to support that the Government's action negatively 
impacted the contractor's ability to satisfactorily perform on the contract. 
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Inappropriate Use. The contracting officer stated there were no attempts of 
inappropriate use of the SABER contract. Therefore, there was no potential negative 
impact on the contractor's ability to perform. 
Other Areas.   The contracting officer noted there was no competition with other 
DoD agencies regarding potential SABER work. 
Base E Analysis 
Background Information. The SABER contract at Base E was awarded for a 
maximum of five years, base period with four options, with a set minimum dollar amount 
of $50,000 per period of performance and a maximum dollar amount of $35,000,000 for 
the life of the contract. 
The award of this contract was based on the reopening of discussions from the 
previous SABER solicitation. The original SABER solicitation included an 8(a) small 
business set-aside and was awarded in January 1998 to a local small business. There was 
a post-award protest that contained two allegations. The first allegation was that the 
Government was not clear on certain technical issues within its solicitation. The second 
allegation was that the small business that was awarded the contract had a partnering 
arrangement with a large construction firm and therefore was not actually a small 
business. Following legal review, the Government's lawyers advised the contracting 
officer to reopen discussions. 
A total of seven contractors placed a bid for the SABER contract. The firm 
chosen was the same contractor that had the SABER contracts at Base D and Base G. 
The contract was awarded in August 1999. Once again, there was a post-award protest 
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and the performance of the contract was put on hold until December 1999 when the court 
lifted the stay. 
There were a limited amount of delivery orders issued on this contract. Under 
contract requirements, the Government SABER personnel requested a technical proposal 
prior to requesting a cost proposal. Both contracting and civil engineering personnel 
noted that the contractor had difficulty providing acceptable technical proposals. This 
resulted in numerous rewrites and delayed the award of delivery orders. The CE SABER 
chief noted that the personnel originally identified to work on the contract in the 
contractor's proposal was not the same personnel once the contract was in place. The CE 
SABER chief also noted that the personnel working on the contract were less qualified 
and experienced than the personnel originally proposed. Therefore, the Government 
SABER personnel spent extensive time with the contractor in an attempt to improve the 
quality of the technical proposals. Since few technical proposals were accepted prior to 
the company's break-up, there were only a few delivery orders actually awarded on the 
SABER contract. 
The contracting officer was informed in April 2000 of the financial difficulties the 
contractor was facing. On 20 July 2000, the contractor's president notified the 
contracting officer at Base E that the company filed for bankruptcy and all work would 
be halted. The contracting officer terminated the contract for convenience on 31 July 
2000. 
Pricing Methodology. Base E used the R.S. Means book for pricing delivery 
orders. The contractor was familiar with the R.S. Means pricing book since it used R.S. 
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Means on its other SABER contracts. The contract's coefficient for work hours ranged 
from 1.138 to 1.188. 
There does not appear to be any Government actions in this area that negatively 
impacted the contractor's ability to perform satisfactorily on the contract. 
Liquidated Damages. Liquidated damages were not assessed against any delivery 
orders on the contract. 
Since liquidated damages were not assessed on the contract, the contractor's 
ability to perform satisfactorily could not have been negatively impacted. 
Project Estimating Fees. The SABER contract contained a Project Estimating & 
Design (PE&D) fee line item. The PE&D fee was based on the magnitude of the project. 
The contractor received $500 for projects estimated under $25,000; $1,000 for projects 
estimated between $25,000 to $200,000; and $2,000 for projects estimated over 
$200,000. 
There does not appear to be any evidence to support that the Government's 
actions in this area negatively impacted the contractor's ability to satisfactorily perform. 
Balanced Work. The actual performance of the SABER contract lasted seven 
months with few delivery orders actually executed on the contract. There were no 
delivery orders awarded during the 4th quarter. 
There does not appear to be any Government actions in this area that negatively 
impacted the contractor's ability to satisfactorily perform on the contract. 
Inappropriate Use. The contracting personnel did not note any inappropriate 
actions as it related to this SABER contract. 
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There does not appear to be any evidence to support that the Government's 
actions in this area negatively impacted the contractor's ability to satisfactorily perform. 
Other Areas. The contracting personnel stated that there have not been any 
competition-related concerns for the SABER program at Base E. 
The contracting and civil engineering personnel identified that the contractor had 
problems with the minimal design issue. The CE SABER chief stated that the quality of 
the technical proposals were unacceptable. He noted that the design provided to the 
Government as part of the contractor's original bid was top-notch. However, the 
contractor had difficulty meeting acceptable standards once the contract was in place. 
Through numerous teaming meetings, the SABER personnel attempted to resolve the 
situation with the contractor. These problems may have been a result of personnel being 
reassigned once the award was protested and halted for four months. These individuals 
were not the same personnel assigned to the contract once the court stay was lifted in 
December 1999. 
Base F Analysis 
Background Information. The SABER contract at Base F was established for a 
maximum of three years, the base period with two options, with a set minimum dollar 
amount of $20,000 and a maximum dollar amount of $3,000,000 for the life of the 
contract. There were no annual minimum or maximum dollar amounts established for the 
contract. 
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Due to the fact that Base F is located in a rural area that is approximately 155 
miles from the closest city, the contract was awarded as an 8(a) small business set-aside 
in a sole source environment. The contract was awarded to the incumbent contractor. 
At the time of the field visit, the contract was at the end of its first year. The 
contract had nine open delivery orders valued over $566,000. Another ten delivery 
orders were in the works as the SABER personnel were preparing for end of fiscal year 
fallout. 
The contract was originally established with the contractor as the prime 
contractor. However, numerous quality control problems resulted in a modification 
changing the contract to a tripartite arrangement where the SBA is the prime contractor 
and the SABER contractor is the subcontractor. 
The Government SABER personnel have weekly partnering meetings with the 
SBA and the SABER contractor in an effort to improve the quality of contract 
performance. 
Pricing Methodology. The R.S. Means book is used for pricing delivery orders at 
Base F. The contractor has not indicated dissatisfaction with the use of the R.S. Means 
book. The contract's coefficient was negotiated prior to contract award. The contractor 
originally proposed a coefficient of 1.435. The final negotiated coefficient was 1.33. 
There does not appear to be any Government action in this area that negatively 
impacted the contractor's ability to perform satisfactorily on the contract. 
Liquidated Damages. The liquidated damages clause was applied to each of the 
nine delivery orders. Liquidated damages were only assessed against one delivery order 
for a total of three days. 
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There does not appear to be any negative impact to the contractor's ability to 
satisfactorily perform on the contract when liquidated damages were assessed. 
Project Estimating Fees. The contract does not have a project estimating fee line 
item. The contract administrator noted that the contractor voluntarily submitted 
proposals for potential work with the understanding that the costs for preparing those 
proposals were not reimbursable if the delivery orders were not awarded. These 
proposals were prepared as part of the end of the fiscal year process. The contract 
administrator noted that a majority of these projects were awarded during the previous 
fiscal year closeout. 
There does not appear to be any evidence to support that the Government's 
actions in this area negatively impacted the contractor's ability to satisfactorily perform. 
Balanced Work. The contract had approximately ten delivery orders awaiting end 
of fiscal year funds. 
As the contractor was the incumbent, a similar situation occurred on the previous 
SABER contract. The contractor had voiced concern over the traditional 4th quarter 
surge. As previously identified, Base F was in a remote locale. Due to the limited labor 
force in the area, the contractor has limited ability to expand and contract the number of 
personnel available for work at any given time in an effort to meet the demands of the 
Government. 
In an attempt to alleviate the situation, the Government SABER personnel and the 
SABER contractor cover these issues during the weekly partnering meetings. The 
objective is to ensure the contractor is not overburdened with 4th quarter surges that 
result in late performance completions and/or poor quality work and design. 
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There does not appear to be any Government-controlled actions that negatively 
impacted the contractor's ability to perform in a satisfactory manner. 
Inappropriate Use. The contracting and civil engineering personnel noted there 
were no incidents of inappropriate use on the SABER contract 
There does not appear to be any evidence to support that the Government's 
actions in this area negatively impacted the contractor's ability to satisfactorily perform. 
Other Areas. The contracting and civil engineering personnel noted that the 
contractor had a quality control problem. Specific areas of concern included the 
contractor's proposals for delivery orders. Civil engineering personnel believed that the 
Government personnel were spending excessive amounts of time reviewing and revising 
poorly written contractor proposals. 
In addition, the contracting personnel identified that the contractor has stated that 
the Defense Finance and Accounting Service was very slow in making payments. The 
contractor stated at that time that the slow payments were not impacting the company's 
ability to perform. 
Base G Analysis 
Background Information. The SABER contract at Base G was awarded for a 
maximum of five years, base period with four option periods, with a set minimum dollar 
amount of $100,000 and a maximum dollar amount of $2,000,000 per period of 
performance. 
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Nine contractors bid for the contract. The award was an 8(a) small business set- 
aside. The contract was awarded to a small firm that had extensive experience with DoD 
construction jobs within the local area. 
The contract had been awarded shortly before the field visit. There were 6 
delivery orders awarded valued over $400,000. Another 18 projects were in various 
stages of the award process. The contracting officer stated that the total would be close 
to $1,000,000 for all of the actions. 
The previous SABER contractor was the same contractor who was awarded 
SABER contracts at Bases D and E. Base G was fortunate that their SABER contract 
expired the month that the contractor filed for bankruptcy. No termination actions had to 
be taken. However, the Government SABER personnel did note that they had numerous 
problems with the previous SABER contractor. 
Pricing Methodology. The current SABER contract used the R.S. Means book for 
pricing delivery orders. Government and contractor personnel did not indicate 
dissatisfaction with the use of the R.S. Means book. The coefficient on the SABER 
contract was 1.318. 
There does not appear to be any Government action in this area that negatively 
impacted the contractor's ability to perform satisfactorily on the contract. 
Liquidated Damages. The liquidated damages clause was included on each 
delivery order. The amount of liquidated damages varied dependent on mission impact. 
The contracting officer stated that liquidated damages were never assessed against the 
contractor on this contract. 
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Since liquidated damages were not assessed on the contract, the contractor's 
ability to perform satisfactorily could not have been negatively impacted. 
Project Estimating Fees. The contract does not have a project estimating fee line 
item. The Government SABER contracting personnel stated that the contractor 
voluntarily submitted proposals for potential work with the understanding that the costs 
for preparing those proposals were not reimbursable if the delivery orders were not 
awarded. These proposals were prepared as part of the end of the fiscal year process. 
The contracting personnel further noted that the contractor did not voice a concern over 
this situation. 
There does not appear to be any Government-controlled actions that negatively 
impacted the contractor's ability to perform in a satisfactory manner. 
Balanced Work. Having been recently awarded, the SABER contract was in its 
initial period. Therefore, the contractor had yet to experience a 4th quarter surge typical 
to SABER contracts. The contract administrator did identify that there were 18 projects 
in various stages of preparation for award under SABER. A majority of these awards 
would be during September. 
Given the fact that the contractor had not yet experienced a surge in activity, there 
were no Government-controlled actions that hindered the contractor's ability to 
satisfactorily perform. 
Inappropriate Use. The contracting officer stated there were no incidents of 
inappropriate use of the SABER contract. Therefore, there was no potential negative 
impact on the contractor's ability to perform. 
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Other Areas. One area identified by the Government SABER personnel was the 
lack of discussion within the SABER community. The contracting personnel identified 
the use of SABER workshops in the past. The purpose of these workshops was for the 
SABER community to gather together to share information and experiences. The 
Government SABER personnel believed it would be beneficial to the whole SABER 
community to implement a program to allow a cross-flow of information between the 
various SABER offices. 
Cross-case Analysis 
This section covers the cross-case analysis of the research. Table 4 provides an 
overview of the results of the cross-case analysis for each of the five areas covered in the 
case study analysis. 
Table 4. Cross-case Analysis of Five Subsidiary Research Questions 














A no no no no no 
B no no no yes no 
C possible no no no no 
D no no no no no 
E no no no no no 
F no no no no no 
G no no no no no 
Cross-case Analysis of Pricing Methodology 
Figure 2 identifies all of the data related to this area that was collected during the 
seven case studies. Each base used the RS Means price book on their SABER contract. 
Of the three bases that contained negative coefficients, two of them resulted in a failed 
situation. The same contractor failed at both installations. However, the failure was a 
result of an internal criminal action by a corporate executive that resulted in the financial 
instability that led to the failure. 
The situation identified at Base C was not found throughout the other case studies. 
There were no other cases where the contract's coefficients were increased by 
modification during the performance period. 
Therefore, there was no evidence found that might imply that the Government 
actions in this area negatively impacted the contractor's ability to perform satisfactorily. 
Base's distance 
to City Cost N. 
Index 
Contractor's 
experience w/ Means 
R.S. Means 









Positive (> 1.0) 
Figure 2. Cross-case Analysis of Pricing Methodology 
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Cross-case Analysis of Liquidated Damages 
Figure 3 identifies all of the data related to this area that was collected during the 
seven case studies. Each of the contracts contained the liquidated damages clause. The 
clause was included on all delivery orders in six of the seven cases. Base B included the 
clause on all orders above $25,000. For orders below $25,000, the determination to 
include the clause was made on a case-by-case basis. There was no indication that a 
domino effect resulted from the Government assessing liquidated damages. 
There was no evidence found throughout the case studies that might imply that 
the Government actions in this area negatively impacted the contractor's ability to 
perform satisfactorily. 
Consideration in 
lieu of LDs 
No domino effect 
Not used extensively 






No domino effect 
Criteria for including 
Not applied to each DO 
Contained clause 
Applied to each DO 
Figure 3. Cross-case Analysis of Use of Liquidated Damages 
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Cross-case Analysis of Project Estimating Fees 
Figure 4 identifies all of the data related to this area that was collected during the 
seven case studies. Five of the seven bases contained project estimating line items within 
the contract. Of the five, four bases actively used the line item in preparation for end of 
fiscal year fallout. 
Four of the seven cases also involved situations where the contractor provided 
free estimates. In each case, the contractor had knowledge that the costs for preparing the 
proposals were not reimbursable if the deliver order was not awarded. There was no 
indication that any of the contractors voiced concern over this practice. 
There was no evidence found that might imply that the Government actions in this 
area negatively impacted the contractor's ability to perform satisfactorily. 
Shelf-life of one year 
Used during end of fiscal year 
Contained line item 
Provided at no cost 





Did not contain line item 
Most 
awarded 
No complaint by 
contractor 




Costs absorbed in total DO cost 
No complaint by 
contractor 
Figure 4. Cross-case Analysis of Project Estimating Fees 
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Cross-case Analysis of Balanced Work 
Figure 5 identifies all of the data related to this area that was collected during the 
seven case studies. 
Five of the bases identified that the contractor experienced a surge in work during 
the period of performance. Three of the cases involved concern by the Government and 
contractor over these surges. Two of the bases, D and F, used a teaming arrangement to 
spread periods of performance on the open delivery orders in an effort to alleviate the 
situation resulting from the surge. The situation at Base B was not a result of 4' quarter 
surge. Rather, the contractor was inundated with a large number of delivery orders. This 
surge was to prepare for a major Air Force exercise. Furthermore, the contractor was 
directly given priority requirements that were not known by the contracting officer. 
While this situation was partially caused by the Government, there is no indication that 
this type of problem existed at the other bases researched. 
There was no evidence found that might imply that the Government actions in this 
area negatively impacted the contractor's ability to perform satisfactorily. 
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Negative impact Teaming arrangement 
No concern Contractor concern 
Experienced surges 
Government concern 
Did not experience surges 
Few delivery orders 
Figure 5. Cross-case Analysis of Equal Balancing of DOs Throughout Fiscal Year 
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Cross-case Analysis of Inappropriate Use 
Figure 6 identifies the data related to this area that was collected during the seven 
case studies. 
In only one case study, Base B, was there any indication that the Government 
attempted to use SABER in an inappropriate manner. In this situation, the contracting 
officer either returned the requirement to the customer for further action or forwarded the 
requirement to the appropriate contracting element for procurement actions. 
There was no evidence found throughout the case studies that might imply that 
the Government actions in this area negatively impacted the contractor's ability to 
perform satisfactorily. 
Requirement forwarded to Requirement sent back to customer for 
appropriate contracting element reconsideration 
Attempted incidents of improper use 
\ 
No incidents of attempted 
improper use 
/ 
No impact on the contractor 
Figure 6. Cross-case Analysis of Inappropriate Use of the SABER Contract 
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V. Results and Conclusions 
Chapter V provides the results and conclusions of this research effort. In 
addition, future research efforts are addressed. 
Results 
The objective of this research effort was to identify and analyze any conditions 
that may have been created by the current SABER acquisition process that led to SABER 
contractor failures. The specific research question addressed by this research was: 
Are there any Government-controlled factors of the SABER acquisition process 
that are leading to contractor failure during the contract's period of performance? 
In an effort to scope the research to a manageable level, five specific areas were 
identified as potential problem areas. A subsidiary research question was created for 
each area. These questions were: 
(1) What was the Government's method of pricing the SABER contract? Did this 
pricing method negatively impact the contractor's ability to satisfactorily 
perform? 
(2) What role, if applicable, did liquidated damages have during the performance 
of the SABER contract? Did the assessment of liquidated damages, when 
applied, negatively impact the contractor's ability to satisfactorily perform on 
existing and future SABER DOs? 
(3) Does the Government reimburse the contractor for the cost of preparing a bid 
for a project that is eventually not executed? If not, did this practice negatively 
impact the contractor's ability to satisfactorily perform on the contract? 
(4) How does the Government balance the issuance of SABER delivery orders 
over the course of the contract period? Were there any surges, particularly in the 
fiscal year 4th quarter, which negatively impacted the SABER contractor's ability 
to satisfactorily perform? 
(5) Was there any inappropriate use of the SABER contract? If so, did this 
negatively impact the contractor's ability to satisfactorily perform? 
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There were no significant findings in any of the five areas that would indicate the 
Government's actions in those areas negatively impacted the SABER contractor's ability 
to perform satisfactorily on the contract. 
Conclusions 
The research effort did not find conclusive evidence to support that the five 
targeted Government-controlled factors of the SABER acquisition process led to 
contractor failure during the contract's period of performance. 
Follow-on Research 
The research effort identified two areas for potential follow-on research. The first 
area relates to the pricing of SABER delivery orders. The standard unit price book used 
is the R.S. Means price book. R.S. Means updates their price book annually to reflect the 
changing environment related to costs. 
Of the seven bases researched, three bases awarded their contract to contractors 
who bid negative coefficients. Each of these contracts failed. 
In addition, the new SABER contractor at Base C has noted the price 
discrepancies between the R.S. Means price book and the local area prices. That 
contractor is working with a positive coefficient, but still claims they are working a 
majority of the time at a loss. 
A potential follow-on research effort could look into the accuracy of the R.S. 
Means price book compared to local costs. Specific attention could focus on the rural 
areas where some Air Force bases are found. 
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A second follow-on effort could focus on the role small businesses have on 
SABER contracts. Four of the seven bases researched involved an 8(a) set-aside. Of the 
four, two failed during contract execution. Base E was in the process of re-procuring its 
SABER contract without an 8(a) set-aside. However, this requires approval from various 
Governmental agencies, including the Small Business Administration. 
Many individuals expressed, during the interview process, their opinion that 
SABER was not appropriate for a small business at their base. A follow-on effort could 
focus on comparing the size of the Air Force base related to the size of the contractor, 
large or small business. The research could then identify whether the SABER program 
was successful at that base and determine whether there is a possible correlation between 
the three areas. 
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Appendix A: First Contact with Primary Point of Contact 
Introduction 
Captain Brian Heaps, 
Primary duty Air Force Specialty Code is 64PX, Contracting Officer 
Graduate student 
Air Force Institute of Technology at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio 
Preliminary contact 
SAF/AQCO is the co-sponsor of my thesis. The point of contact for SAF/AQCO 
is Major Ed LaBenne. Major LaBenne made initial contact with each of you to 
coordinate my site visit and gather data relating to my thesis effort. 
About the research 
Over the past 12 months, 15 SABER contracts have resulted in contract failures. 
For the purpose of this research, contractor failure is defined by two outcomes. First, a 
SABER contractor defaults on its contract during the performance period. Typically, the 
contractor either goes out of business or decides to no longer perform work on the 
existing contract. This results in the Government exercising its right to terminate the 
contractor for default. The second failure outcome results from poor performance by the 
contractor during the performance period. The poor performance leads to a Government 
decision to not exercise an existing option on the SABER contract. 
Research Objective 
To identify and analyze any Government-controlled actions in the current 
acquisition process that negatively impacts and contributes to the failure of contractors on 
SABER contracts. 
Five areas of the current SABER acquisition process have been identified as 
potential problem areas and will be the focus of this research effort. They include: 
(1) The Government's method of pricing SABER contracts (UPB, MEANS...). 
(2) The Government's use of the liquidated damages clause in the SABER 
contract. 
(3) The Government's role in reimbursing the contractor for the cost of preparing 
a bid for a project that eventually is not executed. 
(4) The Government's role in balancing the issuance of SABER delivery orders 
over the course of the contract period (4th quarter surge). 
(5) The Government's inappropriate use of the SABER contract. 
As a stipulation of allowing me to do so, I will send a complete write-up of my 
visit to you for your review prior to publication. 
What I'll Require 
(1) The actual interview questionnaire will be included in Appendix B, which will 
be electronically mailed to your organization. 
(2) A copy of the acquisition plan, contract, and any related materials if the 
contract was terminated or a contract option was not executed. 
(3) Any other related materials pertinent to the site visit. 
I expect to spend one day interviewing the points of contact followed by me 
reading documents and reviewing my notes over the following four to six weeks. A 
number of questions or areas of clarification may arise which will result in the need for 
follow-up questions. This follow-up portion will be through the telephone or electronic 
mail. 
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Appendix B: Field Visit and Interview Guide 
Purpose of the Research 
To identify and analyze any Government-controlled actions in the current 
acquisition process that negatively impacts and contributes to the failure of contractors on 
SABER contracts. 
Interview Questions 
Background information (Pre-award): 
Were there any protests during this period from SABER contract bidders? 
1) Were the team members originally selected for the Government source 
selection on the team throughout the entire source selection process? 
2) What functional areas were included on the SABER source selection team? 
3) What was the team members SABER experience? 
4) Was the team co-located in one facility during the process or any portions of 
the process? 
5) Were the team members dedicated solely to the source selection process? If 
not, approximately how much of their time was spent on the source selection 
percentage-wise)? 
6) Was an acquisition plan developed for the procurement? 
7) Does the acquisition plan contain specific data relating to the overall 
Government acquisition plan, its criteria for selection, and an acquisition 
milestone chart? 
8) Was the milestone chart met? What was the actual execution schedule? 
9) Was a pre-proposal conference conducted prior to dissemination of the 
Request for Proposal (RFP)? Who attended (contractors)? 
10) Were there any modifications to the RFP? What were they for? 
11) What was the minimum and maximum dollar amount listed on the RFP? 
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(12) How many bidders submitted proposals for the SABER contract? 
(13) Was there an 8(a) set-aside for the SABER contract? If so, were any 8(a) 
contractors selected? 
(14) How many contractors were awarded the SABER contract? What 
companies were awarded the SABER contract for the installation? 
(15) If applicable, did the incumbent contractor win any portion of the award? 
(16) What was the awarded amount on the SABER contract? 
(17) Was the SABER contract awarded without discussions? 
(18) Were there any lessons learned identified during these phases of the 
acquisition? What were they? 
Background Information (post-award): 
(1) How many years is the current SABER contract set up for? 
(2) What period of performance is the SABER contract in? 
(3) Were there any protests following contract award? 
Have there been any modifications to the SABER contract? What were they for? 
(4) Are SABER Contracting and SABER CE personnel co-located? 
(5) Are there any lessons learned identified during these phases? 
(6) If the contractor has failed or is in a situation leading to failure, what was/is 
the justification for the termination or the Government's decision not to exercise 
the option on the contract? 
(7) With the elimination of the detailed Government Cost Estimate, how does CE 
perform a technical evaluation and justify the methodology and costs proposed by 
the contractor if it differs from the preliminary estimate submitted by the SABER 
CE Project Manager? 
(8) Are there any other issues not previously covered that could shed light on the 
success/failure of the installation's SABER program? Was anything identified 




(1) How many Delivery Orders (DOs) were issued over the past 12 months? 
What was the total amount awarded during this timeframe? 
(2) How many DOs were issued over the final quarter of FYOO? What was the 
total amount awarded during this timeframe? What work were they for? 
(3) What is used to cost out SABER DOs (Unit Price Book, MEANS 
database...)? 
(4) With the elimination of the detailed Government Cost Estimate, how does the 
Contracting Officer determine fair and reasonable on DOs? 
(5) Does the SABER contract have a bid and proposal cost (where Government 
pays the contractor for the cost of proposals if the work is not performed)? If 
so, has this line item been used and when? 
(6) Has the contractor accepted work above their maximum required amount as 
identified in the SABER contract? 
(7) Have any liquidated damages been assessed on any delivery orders? What 
type of impact was experienced by the contractor (domino effect...)? 
(8) Has there been any bonding issues identified over the performance of the 
contract? 
Method of Data Collection 
A majority of the data will be collected during the site visit and interview process. 
I expect to spend one full day for each site visit. The interview questions provided above 
represent the minimum information relating to my research. Additional information will 
be gathered on a case-by-case basis. 
I will review documents relating to the above questions and request a copy of each 
document for follow-up review. 
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For the validity and reliability of this research, I must address all of the above 
questions. However, discussions will be allowed to take their natural course according to 
the availability of respondents, information, and documentation. 
Follow-up 
It will likely be necessary for me to conduct follow-up calls to clarify and verify 
information during the data analysis process. It is my intention to use the telephone and 
electronic mail to conduct my follow-up efforts. 
To ensure accuracy on the part of the researcher, once the case study is written, it will be 
sent to the respondents for review prior to publication. 
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